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Abstract
In this paper we propose and test a contracting mechanism, Multi-Contract Cost Sharing (MCCS), for
use in the management of a sequence of projects. The mechanism is intended for situations where (1) the
contractor knows more about the true costs of various projects than does the contracting agency (adverse
selection,) and (2) unobservable e®ort on the part of the contractor may lead to cost reductions (moral
hazard.) The proposed process is evaluated in an experimental environment that includes the essential
economic features of the NASA process for the acquisition of Space Science Strategy missions. The
environment is complex and the optimal mechanism is unknown. The design of the MCCS mechanism
is based on the optimal contract for a simpler related environment. We compare the performance of the
proposed process to theoretical benchmarks and to an implementation of the current NASA `cost cap'
procurement process. The data indicate that the proposed MCCS process generates signi¯cantly higher
value per dollar spent than using cost caps, because it allocates resources more e±ciently among projects
and provides greater incentives to engage in cost-reducing innovations.
1 Introduction
Many projects that provide a bene¯t to an entire organization are assigned to a specialized division for
management while being funded through budgets at the headquarters level. Examples include the research
division of a corporation, a team from a construction ¯rm assigned to a building project, or a group of
engineers and scientists assigned to develop a space mission. Often the division has better information
about the eventual cost of the project than does headquarters. When multiple divisions compete for the
assignment of a project, an adverse selection problem exists because each has an incentive to understate its
cost estimations. This may lead to an ine±cient allocation and cost overruns during the execution of the
project.
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1In many cases, the application of greater e®ort on the part of members of the division can reduce the
cost or increase the value of the project. However, the level of the division's e®ort may not be observable
to others, and only the ¯nal observed cost of the project may be contractible. If e®ort cannot be monitored
and there are exogenous sources of cost uncertainty, cost reductions due to e®ort cannot be distinguished
from other variations in costs. A moral hazard problem exists because the organization as a whole would
like the division to exert a di®erent level of e®ort than may be optimal for the division individually.
Both adverse selection and moral hazard create friction between headquarters and the divisions.
These frictions can lead to a signi¯cant loss in performance { less is accomplished for the same dollars
spent { if the appropriate relationship cannot be found. If the division (or more generally, the agent) and
headquarters (the principal) are pro¯t maximizers, then the structure of the optimal relationship or contract
is well known.1 We summarize this theory in Section 2. Under appropriate assumptions on the distribution
and timing of information, the optimal contract can be implemented by the headquarters by o®ering a menu
of linear contracts to the division such that for each possible realized cost value, there is exactly one optimal
contract for the division. Thus, the division self-selects its contract in such a way as to reveal its true
cost level. The contract then speci¯es the percentage of costs to be shared between the division and the
headquarters. When used in government procurement with private contractors, cost-sharing contracts have
generally met with success.2
Most situations in which a headquarters and a division need to establish a good relationship are not well
suited to the pure theory described above. Consider as evidence the following stylized facts. (1) Within a
¯rm, government body, or other organization, retaining pro¯ts at the level of a division is not always possible
and the organization must employ incentives other than the pro¯t motive.3 (2) The goals of headquarters
and the division are often much more aligned than in the canonical principal-agent problem with pro¯t
maximizers. This is partly because the relationship lasts over many periods and success today may breed
more work tomorrow. (3) Information often arrives in bits over time as it is learned by the division instead
of being available at the beginning of the process. The particular setting of interest, NASA's Mission
Acquisition process, features these three complications, among others. The process is detailed in Section 3.
In this paper, we consider the problem of the headquarters-division relationship and ask whether we can
exploit features of the solution to the canonical model in order to improve the outcome in the more realistic
environment. We propose a new contracting process, called Multi-Contract Cost Sharing (MCCS). Under
this system, headquarters o®ers a small number of linear cost-sharing contracts to the division. Since the
the fully optimal solution features an in¯nite menu of linear cost-sharing contracts, the MCCS is a simpli¯ed
approximation to the full solution. We then compare the MCCS process to the \cost cap" system currently
2in place at NASA. Under this system, the headquarters assigns a cost cap to each project and fully refunds
any reported costs up to the cap. The moral hazard problems created by the cost cap rule are obvious, and
we conjecture that the MCCS process will signi¯cantly improve welfare.
Because the MCCS process is only an approximation of the optimal solution and because the environment
of interest di®ers from the canonical model, it is not immediately clear that the MCCS process would improve
welfare. Although the cost cap system may appear inferior, it is has evolved in the NASA environment and
was put in place by actors with very large stakes in the project outcomes. This implies that the existing
process has properties that at least some parties view as desirable. Furthermore, decision makers may exhibit
biases, errors, and learning e®ects not captured by the standard model, making the simple cost cap system
the better choice. For these reasons, we turn to experimental methods to compare the outcomes under the
MCCS process to the outcomes under the cost cap system. By simulating these processes in the lab, we can
directly test our hypotheses and reach conclusions where theory remains inconclusive.
This research is of independent interest to experimental economists because it provides one possible
roadmap for using experiments in the design of real-world institutions. In particular, when existing theory
cannot provide a complete solution to a given problem, simpli¯ed approximations to the solutions of similar
models may capture the desired incentive e®ects. It is then the goal of the experimentalist to test whether or
not these e®ects survive the di®erences in environment and the simpli¯cations of the solution. In that sense,
experiments on institutional design can be thought of as robustness checks of existing theory. Theoretical
solutions that are shown to be robust to the idiosyncrasies of real-world environments then become useful
tools for practical implementation problems.
2 The Theory
In this section we review the standard model of contracting in the presence of adverse selection (asymmetric
information about costs and abilities,) and moral hazard (asymmetric monitoring of e®ort.) The model and
extensions are presented in La®ont and Tirole [11, Chapters 1,4]. This theory provides the foundation for
our proposed system.





is the ¯rm's private `luck' parameter and and e ¸ 0 is the level of e®ort exerted by the
¯rm. The cost to the ¯rm of a given e®ort level e is Ã (e), where Ã (0) = 0, Ã0 (e) > 0 and Ã00 (e) > 0 for each
e > 0, and lime!L Ã (e) = +1.4 The principal, or headquarters in our story, does not observe L directly,
but has a prior belief given by the distribution F (L) with density f (L).5 The ¯rm is fully reimbursed by
3the principal for the ¯nal cost of the project and receives an additional transfer t(C) that may depend on
the realized cost C, but not on the unobservable level of e®ort. The overall pro¯t of the ¯rm is given by
U (e;L) = t(C (e;L)) ¡ Ã (e).
The principal has a ¯xed value of S for the completed project. The total funds transferred from the
principal to the ¯rm is t(C) + L ¡ e. The opportunity cost of these funds is given by ¸ > 0, so the net
surplus to the principal is S ¡ (1 + ¸)(t(C) + L ¡ e). In this model, the principal represents either the
headquarters of a large organization or a regulator interested in overall welfare. Therefore, the principal's
ex-post payo® is
V (e;L) = S ¡ (1 + ¸)(t(C (e;L)) + L ¡ e) + U (e;L)
= S ¡ (1 + ¸)(L ¡ e + Ã (e)) ¡ ¸U (e;L) (1)
The principal maximizes expected payo® by selecting the optimal transfer function t. By the revelation prin-
cipal, the search for the optimal mechanism can be restricted to those incentive compatible direct mechanisms
in which the ¯rm is incentivized to announce its true luck parameter L.
Under complete information, the principal would maximize (1) subject to individual rationality con-
straints by requiring the level of e®ort e¤ that solves Ã0 (e¤) = 1 and setting t = Ã (e¤) so that U (e¤;L) = 0.
With incomplete information, we look for a second-best solution by considering direct revelation mech-




to the principal, who then requires that the





















and can be enforced by penalizing the ¯rm if the actual cost C (e;L)














represents the ¯rm's pro¯t





be maximized at ^ L = L. Letting ~ U (L) ´ ~ U (L;L), La®ont & Tirole [11, Proposition 1.2]
show that
~ C0 (L) · 0 (2)
and
~ U0 (L) = ¡Ã0
³
L ¡ ~ C (L)
´
(3)










to be incentive compatible. Since




¸ 0 is su±cient to guarantee that individual ratio-





4Integrating (3) gives the value of ~ U (L) that must obtain in any incentive compatible scheme. De¯ning
~ e(L) ´ ~ e(L;L) = L ¡ ~ C (L), the expectation of ~ U (L) with respect to F (L) is
Z L
L





Ã0 (~ e(L))dF (L).












s.t. ~ e0 (L) · 1,
(4)
where the constraint is simply equation (2), replacing ~ C (L) by L¡ ~ e(L). The unconstrained solution to (4)
is given by





Ã00 (~ e¤ (L)), (5)
where ~ e¤ (L) represents the optimal choice of ~ e(L). Recall that under complete information, Ã0 (e¤) = 1,
so the second term on the right-hand side represents a distortion due to asymmetric information. The
assumptions of the model guarantee that ~ e¤0 (L) · 0, so the constraint in (4) is satis¯ed at the global
solution. Plugging ~ e¤ (L) into the right-hand side of (3) and integrating the result gives the ¯rm's pro¯t
under this mechanism,
~ U¤ (L) ´
Z L
L
Ã0 (~ e¤ (l))dl. (6)
Using the de¯nition of ~ U (L;L), we have
~ t¤ (L) = Ã (~ e¤ (L)) + ~ U¤ (L), (7)
which identi¯es the optimal transfer function ~ t¤ (L).
Since ~ C¤ (L) is strictly increasing, the inverse function L¤ (C) is well-de¯ned. By replacing L in equation
(7) with L¤ (C), the above direct mechanism can be replaced by an equivalent indirect mechanism with
transfer function ~ t¤ (L¤ (C)). La®ont & Tirole [11, p 68] show that ~ t¤ (L¤ (C)) is strictly convex in C, so it
can be characterized by a continuum of tangent lines, one for each C (or, one for each L¤ (C).) Instead of
o®ering the convex transfer function ~ t¤ (L¤ (C)), the principal can ask the agent to announce ^ L and then




. Speci¯cally, this linear contract
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Figure 1: Both the convex contract ~ t¤ and the linear contract ~ T¤ are incentive compatible. (Picture adapted
from La®ont & Tirole [11, Figure 1.4].)
Refer to ¯gure 1. Since Ã00 > 0, the ¯rm's isopro¯t line in (C;t)-space through
³
~ C¤ (L);~ t¤ (L)
´
, which is
represented by the equation
t0 (C;L) = Ã (L ¡ C) + ~ t¤ (L) ¡ Ã
³
L ¡ ~ C¤ (L)
´
;
is also strictly convex in C. By incentive compatibility (and since the constraint in (4) does not bind,) t0
must be tangential to ~ t¤ (L¤ (C)) at ~ C¤ (L). Therefore, it is tangential to the linear contract ~ T¤ (L;C) at
~ C¤ (L). This implies that ~ T¤ (L;C) is also incentive compatible. By using this menu of linear contracts, the
principal is able to induce the optimal e®ort choices from the ¯rm just as well as with the convex contract.
Finally, the principal can use an equivalent linear indirect mechanism by asking for a cost estimate CE




























This indirect mechanism simply recreates the linear transfer function in (8) by using incentive compatibility
to guarantee that CE will be chosen such that L = L¤ ¡
CE¢
. The reader may verify that this follows from
the ¯rst-order conditions of the ¯rm's maximization problem, as does the choice of e = ~ e¤ (L), con¯rming




is interpreted as a cost-sharing parameter. It indicates the percentage of the







increases. For higher values of CE, the contract resembles a `cost-plus' contract where ¯ = 1.
For low values of CE, the contract resembles a ¯xed-price contract with ¯ = 0.
La®ont & Tirole [11, Chapter 7] analyze the same model with n > 1 ¯rms. The ¯rms are assumed to
compete in an auction where each ¯rm i `bids' its luck parameter ^ Li. The optimal incentive compatible
auction awards the project with certainty to the lowest bidder and induces the same level of e®ort from
the winning bidder as in the monopoly contract above. If L = (L1;:::;Ln), i = argmink Lk, and j =





Ã0 (~ e¤ (l))dl. (10)
Comparing this amount to equation (6), we see that competition has driven down the rents accruing to the
¯rm. In fact, as n grows to in¯nity, the ¯rm's rent shrinks to zero and the equilibrium e®ort approaches the
optimal e®ort under complete information (since F (L) goes to zero in (5).) Thus, competition mitigates the
market failures associated with information asymmetries.
3 Application: NASA Mission Acquisition
In this section, to describe in detail the system whereby the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) procures its Strategic Missions.6 This is a particularly interesting example to study for two reasons.
First, the informational asymmetry between principal and agent appears unusually severe. Costs of NASA
missions are highly uncertain because new technology is typically required for their completion. Because







Figure 2: The NASA Mission Acquisition Environment.
resolve by monitoring. Since new technology is required for most missions, there are sometimes possibilities
for signi¯cant cost-saving innovations on the part of contractors. However, in other instances, no such
innovations are possible, even with great e®ort. It is not always a priori evident which situation one is in.
Thus, drastic di®erences in cost can occur because of choices of e®ort level.
A second reason is that this application has many di±cult features from which the theory usually ab-
stracts. Divisions are cost-centers and not pro¯t maximizers. There is a lot of uncertainly and the relevant
distributions are not common knowledge. Although headquarters and the divisions spend a lot of e®ort
trying to penetrate the technology and to get a better handle on costs, the `cutting edge' nature of the
projects makes it very di±cult to make reliable estimates.
A ¯nal reason to study this particular application is that many parties at NASA view the current process
as unsatisfactory.7 Therefore, there is a reasonable likelihood that the proposal will be ¯eld tested and
benchmarked against the current process.8
3.1 The NASA Mission Acquisition Environment
The organization of the main actors in NASA's mission acquisition process is given in ¯gure 2. The three key
players are the O±ce of Management and Budget (OMB), who oversees NASA's budget and approves mission
requests by NASA, the Space Science Enterprise o±ce at NASA headquarters (Associate Administrator and
¯ve Science Theme Directors), and the Implementing Centers (which can be thought of as divisions of the
main NASA organization). In addition, the space science community at large and their committees and
councils are involved as ¯rst line customers, the American public as the ultimate customer, and various
levels of management in the organizations of the key three players participate in the decision processes.
8We focus here on the relationship between NASA headquarters, who has the role of procuring new
missions, and the Implementing Centers, who are the contractors, but who are also part of the overall
NASA agency. The Implementing Centers manage the construction of missions, often subcontracting with
the private sector. The four largest Implementing Centers for the Space Science Enterprise are the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Ames Research
Center. These organizations rely on formal agreements and contracts to develop and manage NASA missions
as their principal source of revenue, and although they have an interest in the overall success of NASA, they
also have an interest in larger shares of the Space Science budget being allocated to their own part of the
organization rather than to the other Centers.
3.2 The Current Process of Mission Acquisition.
Approximately every ten years, Committees of the Space Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences
publish reports on the state of space science and outline current scienti¯c priorities. The Space Science
Advisory Committee (SScAC) and its subcommittees contribute to the preparation of the Space Science
Strategy. The Strategy is largely based on science and technology \roadmaps" prepared by each science
theme director with the assistance of supporting centers and of roadmap teams sta®ed by science community
representatives and center employees.
The Strategy, issued by the Space Science Enterprise at NASA Headquarters every three years, \trans-
lates" the space science priorities into the missions on which NASA will focus. These are missions that,
under the leadership of headquarters senior management, have been studied and \costed", at various levels
of de¯nition, by one or more of the Implementing Centers. The assignment to the Implementing Center
is made by the Associate Administrator, on the recommendation of the cognizant Theme Director. This
recommendation, in turn, is based on the Center's established role and skill base.
As the study of a mission progresses and the cost estimates become more de¯ned, the Space Science
Enterprise sta® at Headquarters communicates with the science community, OMB and congressional sta®ers,
and cost targets are tested for viability in the budgetary process. As a result, the center is given a Cost Cap,
a maximum dollar ¯gure that can be spent on a mission, with an understanding that respect of the cap is a
condition for mission approval.9 Figure 3 illustrates the payment structure of a cost cap. The contractor is
exactly reimbursed for his costs up to a ceiling level10.
As the studies of the mission become more detailed | and more expensive | it often appears that the
preliminary estimates were optimistic. If this is the case, either of the following may occur: (1) the cap is



















Figure 3: \Cost Cap" reimbursement schedule.
and/or redundancies are deleted with the consequence that the risk of failure (that is, that the space craft is
unable to complete its mission) increases, (2) the cap is deemed unfeasible and an augmentation is requested
by the center, or (3) the mission is cancelled or abandoned.
When descoping occurs, the science community is unhappy, but, generally, accepting of the circumstances,
as long as the science content is above an agreed \°oor". When the °oor is reached, only by accepting
increased risk can one reduce costs. This situation is di±cult to manage well because risk management is
not a familiar discipline in the community, the ability of the stakeholders to understand and communicate
the level of risk and its implications is inadequate, and the stakes are high (both for money and visibility). In
unlucky instances increased risk results in failures that are embarrassing and costly because of investigations,
replanning, and stand{downs.
When the Implementing Center requests an increase in its cap, NASA Headquarters has the choices of:
(a) canceling the mission and requesting authority from Congress to reprogram the funds for other purposes,
(b) requesting an authorization to transfer funds from another mission, which typically requires delay or
cancellation of the other mission, or (c) requesting, from the OMB ¯rst and then the Congress, an increase
in budget authority with explanations of why the earlier estimates were in error. This is viewed as highly
10embarrassing and the proposed budget changes may not be approved. There is also the possibility that
Congress would not only deny the augmentation, but that it would then also cancel the mission and order
the unspent funds to be returned to the Treasury.
3.3 The Current Dilemma
Cost caps are established on the basis of preliminary information both at the Implementing Centers and
at Headquarters. There is a dilemma for Headquarters. On the one hand it should not use caps that are
too tight and result in funding a proposal that cannot be implemented without taking an unacceptable
risk, resulting in failure, or in a request for augmentation when cost growth occurs. It was a series of
failures under cost caps that caused questions to be raised, which led to our study to ¯nd, if possible, better
alternative practices. On the other hand, Headquarters must also avoid caps that are too generous, and
forgo the opportunity to use cost pressure to induce creative thinking. This was one of the real problems
under a regime of cost capped contracts. Headquarters might ¯nd itself in a situation where it wastes public
money, and o®ers an expensive, less appealing and less popular science program. This may ultimately lead
to a permanent loss of funding for space science. The dilemma for the Implementing Centers is between
accepting a low cost cap and taking on excessive risk of cancellation, delay or failure, or holding out for a
higher cost cap and risking the loss of the mission assignment.
These di®erences in objectives between Headquarters and the individual Implementing Centers belie the
popular view that there is a common interest between all units at NASA. There are di®erences in goals and
risk attitudes between Headquarters and the Implementing Centers. There is an asymmetry in information
between the two sides during the study and development process, with the Implementing Center more aware
of cost data. Furthermore, there is competition between the Implementing Centers. At times it takes the form
of direct competition for the contract to build a particular mission, but more generally there is competition
for larger shares of the ¯xed annual budget that Headquarters has earmarked for mission acquisition.
4 The Proposed Process { MCCS
Can we create a Pareto-superior improvement (a win-win change) in the process by which NASA manages
its Mission Acquisition process? We look to the theory in section 2 to give us guidance in the development
of a new mechanism. In particular, we use the insight that a menu of linear contracts can provide incentives
for both the revelation of cost information and for inducing second-best e®ort levels. We do not, however,
use a continuum of linear contracts. Instead, we limit the menu to three. We call our proposal the MCCS
11contracting process. The process is intended for use in environments, such as those of NASA described in
section three, in which ¯nal cost is observable to both parties, and the ¯nal cost depends on the e®ort of the
agent as well as on exogenous random variables. The agent knows the realizations of the random variables,
but neither the e®ort level nor the realization of the exogenous variables are known to the principal.
4.1 Description of MCCS
The MCCS process consists of the following steps.
1. The principal and agent negotiate a baseline cost CB to complete the project. The principal can also
negotiate with multiple agents before choosing the agent to whom the project is awarded and agreement
on the baseline cost is reached.
2. An algorithm, which is known before negotiations begin and is common knowledge, calculates two other
values CL, and CH, a \low" and a \high" cost estimate (requiring that CL < CB < CH) and three
linear contracts, called T (CF;Ck) with k 2 fL;B;Hg, representing \low", \baseline", and \high" cost
estimates and CF representing the ¯nal cost. For example, CL and CH could be computed as ¯xed
percentages above and below CB. T (CF;Ck) denotes the monetary transfer from principal to agent
under contract k when CF is the ¯nal cost. T has the functional form:
T (CF;Ck) = ®k + ¯k (Ck ¡ CF) (11)
Further, CL, CH and T must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints: there exist C¤
and C¤¤ such that CL < C¤ < CB < C¤¤ < CH and
T (CF;CL) > T (CF;Ck) 8k 6= L if CF < C¤ (12)
T (CF;CB) > T (CF;Ck) 8k 6= B if C¤ < CF < C¤¤ (13)
T (CF;CH) > T (CF;Ck) 8k 6= H if CF > C¤¤ (14)
Equations (12)-(14) require there to exist a range of cost realizations for which each contract provides
the highest dollar payment to the agent.11 Satisfying this condition requires that ¯H > ¯B > ¯L.
The low contract resembles most closely a ¯xed price contract, while the higher contract is closer to
a cost-plus contract. If one of these conditions is not satis¯ed, then one might as well replace the two















































Figure 4: MCCS reimbursement schedule.
3. At a later stage after the project begins, when the private cost estimates of the agent presumably
become more precise, the agent selects one of the three contracts under which to operate.
4. After completion of the project and observation of ¯nal cost, the agent receives a payment equal to
T(CF;Ck), where k 2 fL;B;Hg indicates the contract chosen at stage 3. The di®erence between T
and C, if positive, can be carried over by the agent into the future as pro¯t or, in the case of non-pro¯t
¯rms or divisions of organizations, as a credit to o®set the cost of future projects. If the di®erence
between T and C is negative, the agent must pay the principal from retained pro¯ts or, in the case of
non-pro¯t ¯rms or divisions of organizations, from the credits from previous contracts.
A hypothetical example of such a system of contracts is shown in ¯gure 4. The agent's cost of
completing the project is shown on the horizontal axis and the reimbursement received from the principal is
given on the vertical axis. Notice that, as required, each of the three contracts is optimal for the agent for
a range of cost realizations.
134.2 Di®erences Between the Optimal Contract and Our Process
There are two main di®erences in the actual cost-sharing mechanism we use and the one implied by the
solution to the theoretical model. These are guided by practical implementation considerations in the
typical application in which a new contracting system would be proposed, and the typical absence of precise
information about the distribution F(L) and the function Ã(e).
The ¯rst major di®erence is that there are just three contracts in the menu rather than an in¯nite number
corresponding to the number of types. A small number of contracts is more practical for implementation
since it simpli¯es the decisions of the parties involved.12 Also, the contracts are not necessarily optimal
since F(L) and Ã(e) will generally not be common knowledge in applications. Even if an in¯nite number of
contracts were speci¯ed, the contracts would, therefore, in general not correspond precisely to the optimal
menu.
The second major di®erence is that the speci¯cation of CB comes about as a result of a bargaining process
between principal and agent(s).13 In many cases a division of an organization possesses some speci¯c human
capital or other innate advantage over other alternatives, perhaps because of past work in this same area, so
that really is a bargaining problem in which both sides possess some power. When there is more than one
potential contractor, the method of choosing the agent to whom to award the contract is left unspeci¯ed.
The principal is free to negotiate a level of CB with each of the potential contractors, and does not necessarily
need to choose the lower o®er. We consider both the 1 division and 2 division cases in our analysis below.
5 The Experiment
5.1 The environment
In our experiment, subjects have one of two roles, Headquarters (hereafter HQ) or an Implementing Center
(hereafter IC). Each experimental session is made up a series of periods, in which one HQ interacts on a
repeated basis with either one or two IC's. In each period there are two potential missions, A and B, each of
which can be assigned to an IC to construct. Each mission can be designed in three ways: labeled as A1{A3,
and B1{B3.14 Thus with two IC's, in each period HQ can procure two of six di®erent possible products from
the IC's.
Missions are characterized by a value Sj > 0 and a reliability level Rj 2 [0;1]. The reliability of a mission
is the probability that the mission is a \success"; that is, that it actually yields Sj. The value of a mission in
the NASA context represents the bene¯ts of its scienti¯c output. There is a target value Sj that a mission
must contain to be viable. If the mission does not have a value of at least Sj, it is not considered complete.
14In the event that the mission fails, there is a cost of failure Fj, equal to 3Sj, paid by both HQ and the IC that
built the mission. The value of failure in the NASA context represents the losses, political and otherwise,
associated with such outcomes. Sj and Fj are denominated in points, which are convertible to dollars that
the participants in the experiment can take home with them at the end of the experimental session. This
convertibility to dollars is how experimenters create the same incentives for subjects that exist for the NASA
actors they represent.
There are two units of account: the points above and \francs," an experimental currency, that are not
convertible to dollars at the end of the experimental session. Budgets and expenditures are denominated
in francs.15 All francs that a subject may have accumulated over the course of the experimental session
disappear at the end. No incentive is created for subjects to retain or save at the end of the session. That
is, no incentive exists for Headquarters to allocate less than its entire budget to missions, or for the Center
to spend less than its entire budget over the course of the session. Of course, HQ still bene¯ts from keeping
costs down for the missions it procures so that the savings can be used for other missions.
There is a cost function, denominated in francs, for each design of each mission. The cost function for
mission/design j is of the form
Cj (Sj;Rj;ej) = ajS2
j + bj ln(1=(1 ¡ Rj)) + ej + L:
The lower the value of coe±cient aj, the cheaper it is to add value to a mission. The lower the value of
coe±cient bj, the cheaper it is to increase the mission's probability of success. ej represents the amount the
IC spends pursuing a new technology that might reduce the cost of the mission. Expending ej yields an
innovation with probability
P = 1 ¡ z
¡ej
j .
An innovation decreases aj by 1/3 from its current level. L is a random variable that has an expected value
of 0 and may be positive or negative. L represents that information about costs that is not known a priori
but will be learned as the project is actually developed. The cost functions have the property that each
design is the lowest cost method for attaining some levels of Sj: design 3 for relatively low Sj, design 2 for
intermediate levels, and design 1 for high levels. The coe±cients aj, bj and zj for each mission and each
design are given in table 1.
When the mission is completed, the IC can deliver the mission for \launch". If the mission is launched
and is successful, HQ and the IC constructing the mission each receive Sj points. If a mission is not launched,
the payo® for the mission is zero to all parties. If the mission is launched, Rj is the probability that it is
15Mission aj bj zj Sj Fj CEj yj
A1 .003200 60 1.010 500 1500 980 500
A2 .004375 20 1.005 400 1200 760 0
A3 .004750 30 1.005 200 600 280 0
B1 .001400 60 1.010 1000 3000 1580 500
B2 .002400 20 1.005 500 1500 660 0
B3 .007500 30 1.005 200 600 390 0
Table 1: Cost parameters for each design of each mission.
successful and 1 ¡ Rj is the probability that it fails after launch. A \Contractor Bonus" for mission j,
denoted as yj, equal to 500 francs, is awarded to an IC every time a design 1 mission it builds is successful.16
There is no contractor bonus awarded for design 2 or 3 missions. Thus the expected payo®, in points, of a
mission at the time of launch is equal to
E [¼HQ] = RjSj ¡ (1 ¡ Rj)Fj
for HQ and
E [¼IC] = Rj (Sj + yj) ¡ (1 ¡ Rj)Fj
for the IC that built the mission. The target value, the cost of failure, and the contractor bonus for each
design and mission are given in table 1.
5.2 Timing
Each experiment runs for 5 periods. At the beginning of a period, the following information is common
knowledge. There are 2 potential missions that can be constructed by any IC. There is an initial publicly






and is shown in table 1. HQ receives a budget B at the beginning of each period for the
procurement of missions. B is equal to 1500 francs.
To di®erentiate the timing and structure of information we let L =
P
k Lk
ij. Each component is indepen-
dently and identically distributed according to a probability distribution function, F(Lk
ij). The center will
learn the components over time. HQ does not see or know the values of the Lk
ij, only the possibilities from
F(L), unless honestly informed by the IC. Initially, in each period, each center i will have a private cost




information that each center has about its own cost that is not contained in CE
































































Figure 5: Timing of (a) the MCCS process and (b) the Cost Cap process.
to the center in the sense that the center has a stroke of good luck if the publicly available cost estimate
happens to be higher than its current belief about its own cost.
After the contract to construct the mission is awarded, there is an opportunity for the IC building
the mission to obtain an innovation, which is a cost reduction due to e®ort. Afterwards, there is another
independently drawn value from F(L), L2
ij, which is added to the IC's cost estimate. This represents an
exogenous cost shock. Later on during the construction process there is one more opportunity to innovate
and another privately observed exogenous cost shock, L3
ij. When the mission is completed, the IC chooses
whether or not to deliver it for launch.17 If the mission is not delivered, both parties receive a payo® of
zero for the mission. If the mission is launched, everyone learns whether it succeeds or fails and is rewarded
accordingly. Success and failure do not a®ect the budget HQ has in each period, though they may of course
a®ect HQ's budget allocation policy toward IC's in later periods.
5.3 The Multi-Contract Cost Sharing Process
Implementing the MCCS system in the experimental environment described above yields the sequence of
events during a single period illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 5. Activity in each period can be divided into
a series of stages.
17Low Variance High Variance
Mission Contract Ck ® ¯ Ck ® ¯
A1 H 1180 1180 .916 1280 1280 .928
B 980 1016 .633 980 980 .755
L 780 927 .349 680 827 .433
A2 H 831 831 .872 985 985 .905
B 780 791 .544 780 809 .610
L 729 776 .216 575 692 .315
A3 H 340 340 .883 390 390 .911
B 290 301 .565 290 301 .783
L 240 283 .248 190 283 .474
B1 H 1781 1781 .853 2080 2080 .902
B 1580 1620 .605 1580 1639 .763
L 1379 1537 .388 980 1217 .445
B2 H 710 710 .885 960 960 .938
B 660 668 .670 660 685 .835
L 610 643 .405 360 459 .553
B3 H 440 440 .905 490 490 .874
B 390 400 .610 390 405 .708
L 340 379 .315 290 348 .361
Table 2: Menu of Contracts Generated by Cost Sharing Algorithm: All Missions and Designs.
Stage 1 The initial cost estimate CE
j = Cj(Sj;0:95;0) is displayed for each design of each mission. Both




ij is drawn independently each period.
Stage 2 Negotiation Phase: IC proposes a design and a baseline cost, in \francs" for one or more missions.
HQ responds with a countero®er, which may include a proposal for a di®erent mission or the use of a
di®erent design. There are three total rounds of o®ers and countero®ers at this stage. After the third
round, HQ assigns missions and speci¯c designs to IC's. HQ also assigns a cost baseline Ca for each
mission. Once Ca is agreed upon, the menu of contracts is calculated.18 These are given in Table 2
for each design of each mission. The \Low", \Middle", and \High" contracts yield the highest transfer
from HQ to IC for di®erent ranges of ¯nal costs. The headings Low and High variance are explained
later in this section.
Stage 3 First Innovation Phase: IC chooses e1, a level of expenditure on innovation e®ort and realizes an
innovation with probability P1 = 1 ¡ z¡e1. An innovation bene¯ts only the mission with which it is
associated. If an IC receives an innovation associated with mission j, aij decreases by one-third. The
expenditure on e®ort represents a monetary expense in francs that the IC incurs.
Stage 4 IC experiences an independent cost shock L2
ij from F(L). After observing its own shock, IC chooses
18one of the contracts from the menu.
Stage 5 Second Innovation Phase: IC chooses e2, the level of expenditure on innovation e®ort, and realizes
an innovation with probability P2 = 1 ¡ z¡e2. If IC receives an innovation associated with project j,
aij decreases by one-third from its level after stage 3.
Stage 6 Construction Phase: IC builds the mission by spending francs on Sj and Rj in accordance with
the cost function for the mission. Before it does so, IC experiences an independent cost shock L3
ij from
the same distribution as L1
ij and L2
ij.
Stage 7 After Sj and Rj are selected, IC chooses whether or not to deliver for launch. If launched, the
mission is successful with probability Rj. If successful, both HQ and IC receive a payo® of Sj points.
If the mission fails, both HQ and IC receive a payo® of ¡Fj points. If the mission is not launched all
parties receive a payo® of zero for the mission.
Stage 8 The IC is reimbursed t(CF;Ck) francs, where
CF = C
Ã







where I(Sj) equals the cost savings from innovation. t(CF;Ck) = ®k + ¯k(CF ¡ Ck), where k cor-
responds to the contract selected in stage 4. The amount t(CF;Ck) ¡ CF, if positive, is credited
to an account denominated in francs, that the IC can spend on missions in subsequent periods. If
t(CF;Ck) ¡ CF is negative it is deducted from the balance of the account.19
5.4 The Single Contract Cost Sharing Process
In order to isolate the e®ect of the multiple contracts, we also designed a simpler type of cost sharing
mechanism, the single-contract cost-sharing process (SCCS). The sole di®erence between this process and
the process outlined in section 5.3 is that only the baseline contract is available. In stage 2, when Ca is
agreed upon, the IC is required to operate using the baseline contract. Of course, this eliminates stage 4 in
section 5.3. All other stages in the SCCS process operate as described in section 5.3.
5.5 The Cost Cap Process
To provide a standard of comparison to our proposal for MCCS, we implement a stylized version of the current
contracting process used at NASA for mission acquisition in the context of our experimental environment.
The sequence of events in a period of the Cost Cap process is summarized in panel (b) of Figure 5. There are
19eight stages of activity, two of which are di®erent from the stages in MCCS. There are two building stages
(instead of one) and no cumulative reimbursement or carryover of costs.
Stage 1 This is identical to stage 1 described in section 5.3.
Stage 2 First Negotiation Phase: IC proposes a design and a budget to complete a mission. HQ responds
with a countero®er, which may include a proposal for a di®erent design. There are three total rounds
of o®ers and countero®ers. After the third round, HQ assigns missions to ICs and speci¯es the designs
and cost caps kij, where kij is the maximum that center i can spend on mission/design j. HQ is
constrained by the global budget B so that
P
i;j kij · B, where B is the total amount of funds
available for projects in a period. B is equal to 1500 francs in every period of the experiment.
Stage 3 First Innovation Phase: This is identical to stage 3 in section 5.3.
Stage 4 First Construction Phase: IC experiences an independent cost shock L2
ij from F(L). After learning
L2
ij, IC begins construction of its assigned mission according to the agreed upon design. After this
phase the mission has a current value S1
ij and a current reliability level R1
ij. At the end of this stage
the IC has spent aij(S1




Stage 5 Second Negotiation Phase: This is similar to stage 2 except that there is one round of o®er and
countero®er. Here HQ can cancel, contract new missions, or change the design of previously assigned
missions. If the design is changed, 50% of the science and reliability level of the previous design





Stage 6 Second Innovation Phase: This is identical to stage 5 in section 5.3.
Stage 7 Second Construction Phase: IC can spend money to add more value S2
ij and reliability R2
ij. Value
and reliability are cumulative so that Sj = S1
ij + S2
ij and Rj = R1
ij + R2
ij. Beforehand, IC experiences
another cost shock L3
ij from the same distribution as but independent of L1
ij and L2
ij.
Stage 8 After Sj and Rj are selected, IC chooses whether or not to deliver for launch. If launched, the
mission is successful with probability Rj. If successful, both HQ and IC receive a payo® of Sj points.
If the mission fails, both HQ and IC receive a payo® of ¡Fj points. If the mission is not launched all
parties receive a payo® of zero for the mission.
There is no cost reimbursement here. All expenditures in Stages 4 and 7 were required to be less than
or equal to the cost caps negotiated in Stages 2 and 5. Any excess francs at this point are removed from the
experiment: neither the IC nor HQ may keep them.
205.6 Principal di®erences between environment of model and experiment
There are some major di®erences in the environment described here and the assumptions of the theoreti-
cal model described in section 2. Properties of the NASA environment described in section 3 guided the
di®erences.
1. In the experiment, Center i learns the components of the productivity parameter Li as the game
proceeds, and does not know the full realization of Li at the beginning of the process. There are three
independent shocks that comprise Li, two of which are incurred after the ¯rst negotiation phase, and
one of which occurs after the second negotiation phase, in contrast with a single negotiation phase
after the single shock in the theoretical model. In the model the adverse selection (drawing of Li)
occurs before the moral hazard (choice of ei). In the experiment, adverse selection problems and moral
hazard opportunities occur in overlapping stages during the process.
2. In the experiment, greater e®ort yields lower cost stochastically. By spending money on innovation,
the agent makes an investment that yields a reduction in cost with a probability that is increasing with
the expenditure, but predetermined in magnitude.
3. The use of the transfer t is restricted in the experiment. It can be used, if at all, only to fund missions
in subsequent periods. The contractor can get no bene¯t by retaining it as pro¯t. The utility of the
transfer to both sides, which is equal to the opportunity cost of the funds, thus di®ers from a model
in which the funds may be used for many other purposes.
4. The agent and the principal both receive utility from the completion of the mission. This represents
the fact that in our application both principal and agent are members of the same organization. In
the NASA example, the engineers and scientists working on construction of a mission often use the
scienti¯c output from the mission in their own research, and thus are also consumers of the science the
mission generates.
5. In the experiment, multiple missions may be contracted simultaneously in a period. One mission may
be assigned to each of two IC's or two missions may be assigned to the same IC. The presence of
multiple designs for each mission means that there are also group-level incentives for the two parties to
coordinate on the most cost-e®ective design. The appropriate design can di®er from period to period
because of the exogenous randomness in costs.
6. In the experiment, there are global budget constraints that limit how much can be spent on a collection
of missions. However, because the contractor cannot shift budgets between missions, each contract is
21independent except for the fact that they must be paid for by HQ out of one global budget. In the
NASA example, this represents the typically binding budget constraints imposed by OMB during the
appropriations process.
7. The good the contractor in the experiment delivers is a lottery, since it consists of a value and a
probability of success/failure. In the theoretical model, there is no uncertainty about the ¯nal payo®
the principal receives from the delivery of the good.
5.7 Experimental design, treatments, and sessions
There are three factors that are systematically varied in the experimental design. The ¯rst factor is the
contracting process. One of the three contracting procedures described above is in e®ect. As detailed below,
the second factor is the number of Centers (either 1 or 2), and the third is the distribution of cost shocks
(Low Variance and High Variance).
One vs. two IC's: The 1IC treatment involves two subjects paired in the roles of one HQ and one IC. The
2IC treatment consists of groups of three subjects, one in the role of HQ and two in the role of competing
ICs. We study both cases because the incentives of the actors di®er qualitatively in the two situations, and
both situations are relevant to our ¯eld application. In the situation of 1IC, the incentives of HQ and the IC
are, other than the presence of the bonus to the IC from successful completion of design 1 missions, perfectly
aligned, and therefore the interaction has many properties of a common interest game. Both parties have
common incentives to allocate budgets optimally across missions and across time. However, in the 2IC case,
there are two ICs competing for the same funds and thus each IC's incentives are not perfectly aligned with
HQ and are in con°ict with the other IC. Recall that each IC does not receive any earnings for missions
completed by its competitor.
Variance of cost shocks: The distribution of the cost shocks F(L) was varied systematically. In the
Low Variance (LoVar) treatment all cost shocks were drawn from uniform distributions with support on
the interval [¡200;200], on average 16:6% of the initial cost estimate, for design 1 missions and [¡50;50]
for design 2 and 3 missions (7.1% and 15.3% of average initial cost estimates for design 2 and 3 missions
respectively). In the High variance treatment (HiVar), cost shocks were drawn from uniform distributions
on the intervals of [¡500;500] for design 1 missions, [¡300;300] for design 2 missions, and [¡100;100] for
design 3 missions. These amount to on average 41.3%, 42.5%, and 30.0% of the initial cost estimates for
design 1, 2, and 3 missions respectively.
There were 58 independent series of periods where the same pair or group of subjects interacted. Each
series consisted of ¯ve periods. Subjects were recruited from the graduate student population at Purdue
22Number of Periods Collected
Number of Variance of Cost Caps MCCS SCCS
Centers Cost Shocks Inexper. Exper. Inexper. Exper. Inexper. Exper.
1 Low 5 10 30 5 0 20
1 High 30 15 20 15 0 0
2 Low 20 5 25 5 10 20
2 High 20 10 20 5 0 0
Total 75 40 95 30 10 40
Table 3: Amount of data gathered.
University. The experiment was entirely computerized. The program, which was developed speci¯cally
for this experiment, was written in Perl, ran on a UNIX server accessible from the Internet, and subjects
interacted with the program through a web browser. The instructions for the experiment are available from
the authors. There were up to three pairs of agents in the 1IC treatment and up to two groups in the 2IC
treatment interacting in the laboratory simultaneously, though each group was completely independent of
the others and at no time became aware of the decisions taken in other groups. Each subject remained
grouped with the same person(s) for the entire session.
In Experienced sessions all subjects had participated in a previous experiment in this study. This meant
that they were familiar with the environment. In Inexperienced sessions no subject had previously partici-
pated in an experiment of this type. In each Inexperienced session, there were three practice periods and in
each Experienced session there was one practice period, before the ¯ve periods that counted toward subjects'
earnings began. Participants were not paid for any earnings accrued during practice periods. Inexperienced
sessions averaged approximately three hours in length, and experienced sessions averaged approximately 90
minutes. Table 3 describes the amount of data available under each treatment.
6 Results
6.1 Performance of the Multi-Contract Cost Sharing Process
Figures 6 through 9 indicate the average values of two measures of performance of the three processes,
with both experienced and inexperienced subjects. The measures of performance of the processes in the




j [RjSj + (1 ¡ Rj)Fj]xij and the period
payo® to ICi, de¯ned as ¼IC =
P
j [Rj (Sj + yj) + (1 ¡ Rj)Fj]xij. xij equals 1 if IC i is assigned mission j
and 0 otherwise. The ¯gures illustrate the average level of ¼HQ by period as well as the average by period
of the total ¼IC of all ICs.
23In the ¯gures, the observed payo®s from the three processes described in section 5 are compared to
two benchmark outcomes. The two benchmarks are the payo®s that would result if parties made optimal
decisions and maximized their average payo® (¼HQ + ¼IC)=2. The ¯rst benchmark, called the No Carryover





xj [RjSj ¡ (1 ¡ Rj)Fj + yj=2] (15)
such that
Sj ¸ Sj 8j (16)




j (Sj;Rj;0) · B (18)
xA1 + xA2 + xA3 · 1 (19)
xB1 + xB2 + xB3 · 1 (20)
where xj = 1 if mission/design j is assigned to any IC and 0 otherwise.
The solution to (15)-(20) represents the value resulting from an optimal allocation of 1,500 francs over
one period. (16) requires the value of each mission to be at least the target level, (17) constrains missions
to be allocated in integer quantities, (18) requires that the budget is not exceeded, and (19)-(20) ensure
that at most one A and one B mission are allocated. For simplicity, it is assumed that Lij = 0 and ei
= 0 for all i and j. That is, every cost shock is equal to zero, and no innovation e®ort is exerted. The
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j].
A second benchmark we compare to the performance of our three processes is the Carryover Benchmark.
It is calculated by solving the optimization problem in (15)-(20), but replacing (17)-(20) with:




j (Sj;Rj;0) · B (22)
xA1 + xA2 + xA3 · 5 (23)























Figure 6: Average period payo®s to HQ in sessions with inexperienced subjects.
The Carryover Benchmark assumes that funds can be borrowed from or carried over into the future
during a ¯ve period horizon. In other words, it represents the optimal allocation of ¯ve yearly budgets, a
total of 7,500 francs, over ¯ve periods. The di®erence between the Carryover and No-Carryover benchmarks
provides a measure of the e®ect on earnings of the ability to carry over savings from period to period. This
di®erence is 188 points for HQ and 94 points for the IC's. As we argue below in Observation 1, the MCCS
process both outperforms the Cost Cap process and generates higher payo®s than both benchmarks. Both
parties, HQ and IC's, are better o® under MCCS than under Cost Cap or at the benchmarks.
Observation 1 The payo® to both HQ and the IC's is (a) greater under MCCS than under Cost Cap and
(b) greater under MCCS than both benchmark payo® levels.
Support. For each measure, we can compare MCCS and Cost Cap under eight di®erent and independent
treatment cells ([1IC and 2ICs] * [Experienced and Inexperienced Subjects] * [High and Low Variance]).
If the two processes on average generate the same value of the measure, the probability that the average
value of the measure for one contracting system exceeds the other for all 8 comparisons is .0039. Therefore,
we can reject the hypothesis that the two processes generate identical average values of the measure at the
p < 0:005 level, if the value of the measure is greater for one process than the other in 8 of 8 comparisons.























Figure 7: Average period payo®s to HQ in sessions with experienced subjects.
treatments and for both experience levels (in eight out of eight comparisons between treatment cells). With
experienced subjects, the MCCS process outperforms the No-Carryover and the Carryover benchmark from
the point of view of both parties in eight of eight treatment pairs ([HQ and IC] * [LoVar and HiVar] * [1IC
and 2IC]).20
Thus both HQ and the IC receive gains from a change from Cost Cap to MCCS.21 There is little
improvement with experience under the Cost Cap system, but there is considerable improvement with
experience under MCCS. The Cost Cap system appears to be simpler and subjects reach the limit of how well
the system can do more quickly than under MCCS. In only four of eight treatment cells ([HQ and IC]*[LoVar
and HiVar]*[1IC and 2IC]) are average payo®s higher among experienced than among inexperienced subjects
under Cost Cap. On the other hand, under MCCS, in 8 of 8 cases, average payo®s are higher in experienced
than in inexperienced sessions. The relative advantage of MCCS is greater under 2IC and under High
variance conditions. It may be the case that MCCS becomes relatively more e®ective in the presence of
competition between agents.
The superior performance of MCCS relative to Cost Cap is not merely due to the ability to carry over
funds between periods, which relaxes the constraint that the budget must balance at the end of every period.

























Figure 8: Average period payo®s to the ICs in sessions with inexperienced subjects.
in payo® between Cost Cap and MCCS to the di®erence in payo® between the Carryover and No-Carryover
benchmarks. For experienced subjects, the di®erence in total payo® (¼HQ + ¼IC) between MCCS and Cost
Cap is greater than the di®erence in the two benchmarks in all four treatments. This indicates that the
bene¯t of MCCS is not merely the fact that it relaxes the constraint that budgets must be spent in the
current period.
The second piece of evidence comes from comparing the single-contract cost sharing process (SCCS) with
the multiple-contract version. The single-contract process includes the ability to carry over and borrow funds
across periods like the multi-contract version. Di®erences between multi and single-contract cost sharing
cannot be attributed to carryover and indeed not to cost sharing itself. In the three treatment cells in which
it was applied, SCCS outperforms Cost Cap, but does not do as well as MCCS. The total payo® (¼HQ + ¼IC)
is greater under MCCS than under SCCS, and in turn is greater under SCCS than under Cost Cap, in the
2IC LoVar treatment with both experienced and inexperienced subjects and in the 1IC LoVar treatment with
experienced subjects. This indicates that the multiple contract structure and IC self-selection themselves
promote high payo®s when added to cost sharing and carryover.
The Cost Cap process yields higher payo®s than the no-carryover benchmark for HQ in seven of eight


























Figure 9: Average period payo®s to the ICs in sessions with experienced subjects.
process relative to the benchmark process may be due to HQ's ability to unilaterally specify caps at the end
of the negotiating process, giving HQ more bargaining power than ICs. Since MCCS realizes higher value
than optimal decision making when luck and e®ort are set to zero, it must be the case that MCCS is able
to induce a level of e®ort that on average reduces costs, and/or allocates resources toward missions and IC's
who have experienced favorable exogenous cost shocks. Observation 2 below summarizes di®erences between
the two systems in measures that are typically of interest in ¯eld applications: ¯nal costs, the probabilities
of non-delivery and failure, and the number of innovations realized.
Observation 2 On average, there is more innovation, lower ¯nal cost and less frequent non-delivery of
projects under MCCS than under Cost Cap.
Support. The data in table 4 show that there is more innovation per mission under MCCS than under
Cost Cap in seven of eight treatments (and an equal amount in the eighth treatment). The non-delivery
of contracted missions is more frequent under Cost Cap than under MCCS for each of the eight relevant
comparisons. Average cost relative to original estimated costs are lower under MCCS than under Cost Cap
for eight of eight possible comparisons, even when the missions that are not delivered (which occur more
frequently under Cost Cap and which tend to have unfavorable cost shocks) are censored from the data.
It appears that MCCS yields more innovation than Cost Cap because of the ability of IC's to
28Number Variance of (Overall / Experienced Only)
of ICs Cost Shocks Cost Caps MCCS SCCS
% of 1 Low 12.5% / 10% 4% / 0% 4.50%
Missions 1 High 23.7 / 23.1 1.9 / 0 {
Not Delivered 2 Low 23.4 / 50.0 0 / 0 7.8 / 0.0
2 High 25.4 / 25.0 2.8 / 14.3 {
CF=CE
j 1 Low 1.15 / 1.20 1.00 / 1.11 1.042
(Avg. of 1 High 1.05 / 1.04 0.98 / 0.80 {
completed 2 Low 1.20 / 1.34 0.99 / 1.01 1.01 / 1.00
missions) 2 High 1.05 / 1.06 0.88 / 0.95 {
Reliability Rj 1 Low 97.1% / 99.3% 96.7% / 98.1% 95.60%
(Avg. of 1 High 98.1 / 95.9 95.8 / 98.2 {
completed 2 Low 96.1 / 95.4 93.4 / 97.1 95 / 95.73
missions) 2 High 98.0 / 97.5 95.3 / 96.1 {
Number of 1 Low 1.07 / 1.40 1.2 / 1.4 0.7
Innovations 1 High 0.89 / 0.73 1.49 / 1.6 {
per Period 2 Low 0.64 / 0.80 1.0 / 1.0 0.87 / 1.10
2 High 0.63 / 0.10 1.2 / 1.6 {
Table 4: Summary of results for all periods.
appropriate cost savings and the provision by HQ of insurance against unsuccessful innovations. There
tends to be more innovation under multi-contract than under single-contract cost sharing especially in 1IC
treatments. The multiple contract version of cost sharing induces better incentives to innovate during the
¯rst innovation opportunity than the single contract version. Under MCCS, the steeper cost share coe±cients
for the high contract provide more insurance against unsuccessful innovation. The relatively °at coe±cients
in the low contract mean that the IC can appropriate a greater share of the savings from innovation.
Under Cost Cap, the incidence of non-delivery is not reduced by experience, so there is no evidence that
it is a transitory phenomenon that would disappear with learning. Non-delivery is more common under
HiVar and when there are two IC's. High variance creates an additional inability to complete missions on
time when \bad luck" occurs. With two IC's, the phenomenon of \buy-in", a strategy on the part of an
IC to negotiate a low cost cap in order to win the contract but in anticipation of a later renegotiation to
increase the cap, causes contracts to often be awarded at budgets too low to allow them to be completed.
Final costs are roughly 15% lower for completed missions on average under MCCS than under Cost Cap.
Under all of the mechanisms, conditional on completion, average costs are lower under HiVar than under
LoVar. This is because if there is a tendency for projects with relatively good cost draws to be assigned,
and the expected cost to the low-cost IC of the most cost e®ective mission is lower under HiVar. Average
¯nal costs are similar under SCCS and MCCS, and costs under SCCS are lower than under Cost Cap in
each of the three treatments where SCCS is applied. The cost per mission shows little tendency to decrease
29over time under any of the processes, but the composition of missions changes over time in MCCS to shift
to higher value missions, leading to increases in payo®s.
6.2 Where does MCCS under-perform?
In the preceding section, we have argued that the MCCS process is a signi¯cant improvement over Cost
Caps, the current process in use for our application. The experimental data, however, allow us to identify
three systematic biases in decision-making by participants in the MCCS system. The modi¯cation of MCCS
in ways that would reduce these biases could further improve the performance of the system.
Bias 1 MCCS exhibits a tendency toward overinvestment in e®ort relative to optimal behavior.
Support. Optimal investment in innovation is de¯ned as the level of investment that minimizes the expected
cost of completing the mission at the target value Sj. Under MCCS and 1IC, 81.8% of design 1 missions
were characterized by greater than optimal e®ort; while 12.8% had lower than and 5.4% had exactly the
optimal level. Under 2IC, 54.2% of design 1 missions included overinvestment, 41.7% had underinvestment
and the rest were optimal. Under SCCS 80% of design 1 mission innovation opportunities are characterized
by overinvestment with 2IC's. Under 1IC, the comparable ¯gure is 56.3%.
Bias 2 In the 2IC treatment of MCCS, there is some tendency to award contracts to the IC that does not
have the lowest estimated cost at the time of the award.
Support. Under MCCS, only 65.5% of missions were awarded to the IC with the lowest initial cost estimate.
With SCCS, only 58.8% of contracts were awarded to the IC with the lowest cost estimate. Most ine±cient
allocations appear to be due to a tendency for HQ to try to distribute the missions evenly between the
ICs, even though this means often not awarding missions to the lowest cost suppliers. Although an even
distribution of contracts may be a goal of NASA in practice, there were no direct incentives in the experiment
for this to occur. Nevertheless, it often happened.
Bias 3 At the levels of science and reliability chosen by the IC's, the marginal return on expenditure tends











This means that expected payo®s to IC's would typically be higher if marginal expenditures were sub-
stituted from science to reliability. In all but 6 of 37 completed missions under MCCS in which Sj > Sj,
30the marginal return on Rj was greater than on Sj (in the missions where Sj = Sj, equation (15) does not
necessarily indicate a bias because the marginal expenditure on Sj allowed the threshold level Sj to be
attained). Of the 6 exceptions, 5 were under 1IC. Under SCCS, the marginal return to the IC is higher on
Rj than on Sj for every single mission, including the eleven missions that had the property that Sj > Sj.
In contrast, under Cost Cap, in 50 out of 103 missions in which Sj > Sj, 48.5%, the return of the marginal
franc spent on reliability exceeded that spent on increasing the value of the project. Since a change in the
contracting process removes the bias toward insu±cient spending on reliability, bias three appears to have
its origin in the MCCS process itself rather than in the underlying preferences of agents.
7 Discussion
We have used the theory of optimal contracting under moral hazard to guide us in proposing and constructing
a procurement system, Multi-Contract Cost Sharing, for use in contracting applications. Our experimental
data show that the MCCS system performs well compared to benchmark algorithms and compared to an
alternative mechanism, Cost Cap, a version of which is currently in use in NASA Mission Acquisition, an
environment with a structure similar to the experimental environment. Both principal and agent are better
o® under MCCS than under the Cost Cap system, and therefore no party should have a stake in opposing
implementation. Comparison of MCCS with an alternative, SCCS, suggests that the menu structure of
contracts and the ability for the agent to delay choice of contract improve the performance of the system
over simpler linear cost sharing systems.
Some of the properties of MCCS that appear to enhance its performance are the following. (1) The agent
has an additional incentive to innovate to reduce costs since he keeps a portion of the cost savings. This
bene¯ts both parties because the principal also re-appropriates some of the savings. (2) The principal shares
in the cost of sensible but unsuccessful innovation attempts and the presence of this insurance encourages
the agent to innovate more, to the bene¯t of both parties. (3) The ability to keep a portion of the cost
savings allows both parties to save money to compensate for future bad luck { another form of insurance.
(4) Additional funds are automatically released to reduce the incidence of delays when bad luck occurs. (5)
The agent is encouraged to select the relatively cheap \Low" contract when its costs are low and this reduces
the incentive to spend additional money on a project unproductively. (6) The contract is chosen late in the
process when cost estimates are more precise.
The experimental results reveal the weaknesses of a contracting system where costs are capped. A cost
ceiling is not °exible enough to cope with unavoidable cost increases, which require an increase in the cap,
31or to e±ciently exploit favorable cost shocks by lowering the level of reimbursement in such circumstances.
It also only contains incentives to reduce cost for certain ranges of the exogenous variables; that is, when
innovations increase the likelihood that the ¯nal cost is below the cap. If costs are su±ciently below the cap,
or are unlikely to be reduced to below the cap even with great e®ort, the agent will have no strong incentive
to exert e®ort to seek cost reductions.
Of course, the degree to which the experimental results presented here parallel those that would be
observed in ¯eld applications cannot be known with certainty until the mechanism is implemented. There
are three types of questions that arise with extrapolation from the laboratory to ¯eld applications, which
typically involve higher stakes, a natural rather than a laboratory setting, and decision makers with di®erent
characteristics and training. The ¯rst question is whether behavior of humans changes when the monetary
stakes are increased to levels that exist in ¯eld applications. Experiments in which the scale of payo®s is
varied show that the scale of payo®s does not in°uence results qualitatively (see for example Smith and
Walker [18]). Experiments in developing countries, (for example Kachelmeier and Shehata [8] and Cooper
et al. [4]) in which large sums of cash are paid relative to subjects' overall incomes also show only minor
di®erences in behavior from experiments with university students in developed countries. There is evidence
that players are more risk averse at higher stakes (Holt and Laury [7]). However, increased risk aversion
would likely improve the performance of MCCS relative to Cost Cap because under MCCS the IC does not
bear exclusively the risk of attempting to innovate.
The second question is whether behavior di®ers inside and outside of the laboratory setting. Some recent
experiments comparing behavior in the laboratory and on television game shows are useful in this regard,
because the precise rules of the game show can be recreated in the laboratory. Several studies show similar
behavior in the two settings (see for example Cason and Tenorio [3] or Healy and Noussair [6]).
The third question is whether behavior di®ers between untrained student subjects and professional
practitioners who have though long and deeply about the strategic structure of the situation. The current
evidence from professionals and students participating in identical experiments has not yielded any major
di®erences. Examples include King et al. [9] who studied the behavior of experimental asset markets with
stock traders as subjects and Bohm and Carlen [2] who studied negotiation in the laboratory with diplomats
as subjects.22
As a ¯nal thought, in our experimental environment there was an incentive to spend the totality of the
allocated budgets. That is, we have modeled a government agency without a pro¯t motive. We have no
reason to believe, however, that the treatment e®ects we observe, in particular the strong performance of
the MCCS system, would not also be observed when a direct pro¯t motive exists.
32Notes
1This theory is due to La®ont and Tirole, [10] and [11].
2There have been several instances of the use of cost-sharing contracts in US government procurement. All have used
di®erent cost sharing rules than the MCCS process. The Air Force Peace Shield program contract had an incentive structure
where there was an agreed upon baseline cost, the Air Force paid 75% of any overrun, and the contractor kept 75% of any
underrun. In addition, the contractor received a $50 million bonus if the project was completed early, and incurred a $50m
penalty for late delivery. There was a payment ceiling of 125% of the baseline cost. Another example is Lockheed Martin's
contract for the F-117A in which the Defense Department and Lockheed Martin shared the cost of any overrun and savings
from any underrun at a rate of 50%. 50-50 cost sharing also applied to the US Army's procurement of the Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS). In 1987, the GAO conducted a review of 60 DOD incentive contracts and found that the ¯nal costs
of the majority of contracts were within 5% of target costs. 47% were below and 53% were above target. 21% exceeded the
original ceiling price (US Army, [19]).
Cox et al. [5] compared cost sharing and ¯xed-price contracting in the laboratory. Their results indicate that cost
sharing allows projects to be completed at lower cost than ¯xed price contracting. However, cost sharing is less e±cient than
¯xed price contracting in the sense that the contract is less likely to be awarded to the lowest-cost contractor.
3This is especially true of many government agencies such as NASA who are constrained by Congress from transferring
money between many budget categories.
4The additional technical assumption of Ã000 (e) ¸ 0 is used to eliminate stochastic mechanisms and guarantee that the
optimal choice of e®ort is nonincreasing in L.





6There are have been several other research projects that have used experimental methods to focus on NASA-related economic
issues. See Banks, Ledyard and Porter [1], Noussair and Porter [15] Ledyard, Noussair and Porter [13] and Ledyard, Porter and
Wessen [12] for examples.
7This observation was made in 1999 when we began this project.
8There is follow up work currently underway at NASA to lead to exactly this.
9The capping of costs is very unusual for contracts in which new technologies are involved and the costs to the contractors
are highly uncertain. In most such cases in the private sector, the contractor will typically only agree to a cost-plus contract
structure, in which he is paid the full amount of his cost plus a ¯xed amount. At NASA, before 1993, cost-plus contracting was
typical, and the current system of cost caps was put in place in response to a series of severe cost overruns under the cost-plus
system.
10Note that the cost cap process di®ers from a ¯xed price contract. Under a ¯xed price contract, if the ¯nal cost to the
contractor is less than the ¯xed price, the contractor keeps the di®erence. Under a cost cap system, the contractor must rebate
the di®erence to the contracting agency. The cost cap system does not contain any positive incentive to reduce costs below the
cap. There is an incentive to hold costs equal to the cap, because of the threat of cancellation of the mission, which is costly
both because the Center values the mission, and because its reputation would then be damaged. It would then be less likely to
receive contracts for future missions.
11The linearity of the contracts implies that at C¤, the Low and Baseline contracts yield the same transfer, and at C¤¤, the
Baseline and High contracts yield the same transfer.
12One might wonder why not use just one contract. Below we describe the tests we conducted to study this alternative. As
discussed in section 6 of this paper, we found that three is indeed better than one.
3313This suggests that the appropriate \optimal contracting problem" is not the traditional one where the principal is given
the ability to propose a take-it-or-leave-it contract. Instead we should look for contracts that are interim e±cient subject to
incentive compatibility and voluntary participation constraints on both the principal and the agent.
14Design 1 represents a design that yields high science value if the mission is successful, is expensive relative to other designs,
and often requires a major technological innovation to be completed. Design 2 represents a standard design with \o®-the-shelf"
technology that yields lower science value than design 1, but is cheaper and can be infused with higher reliability (lower risk)
at lower cost. However, it is very di±cult to innovate and integrate new technologies within design 2. Design 3 is a low-budget,
minimally acceptable design, which is at the \science °oor" for the mission. It is also di±cult to innovate within the framework
of design 3, but it is inexpensive to ensure a high-likelihood of success. An IC can only be working on one design for a mission
at a time. Payo®s can only be obtained for one A mission and one B mission in a given period, representing the fact that
building two of the same mission, even if the design is di®erent, duplicates the same scienti¯c output.
15Expenditures will be constrained by budgets. How this is done is an organizational design choice and will be varied in the
experiments. More details will follow.
16The contractor bonus represents future pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards derived from the successful completion of a
prestigious mission that required a break-through innovation. The design 1 missions in the experiment represent such missions.
17Non-delivery of a mission in our framework corresponds to the cancellation of a NASA mission. Cancellation may be done
by an IC to sacri¯ce one mission to improve the chances of success for another.
18All negotiations were carried out through the experimental software so communication was limited. During the negotiation
process, subjects have access to a computer screen that allows them to compute their hypothetical reimbursement for any
baseline cost, any of the three contracts, and any ¯nal cost.
19At the end of a period, the account of an IC or HQ could have a negative balance up to ¡1000 francs, but at the end of
period 5, the balance was required to be positive. If either of these rules were violated, the subject was required to pay a ¯ne
of 3000 francs, which was prohibitive given the earnings in the experiment. If the balance fell below ¡1000 before period 5, the
subject was also required to leave the experiment.
20It might be argued that the payo® to HQ and the payo® to IC are not independent. If total payo® (¼HQ+¼IC) is measured
rather than the payo®s to the separate actors, four comparisons of total payo® can be made between di®erent processes [(LoVar
and HiVar)*(1IC and 2IC)]. If this is done, then MCCS yields higher total payo® under all four comparisons for both experienced
and inexperienced subjects. MCCS yields higher payo® than the two benchmarks under all four comparisons when subjects are
experienced.
21The introduction of cost sharing a®ects the composition of the completed missions. Under Cost-Sharing, a greater percentage
of the completed missions are the more innovative \Design 1" missions, for which IC receives extra payo®.
22In addition to the data reported in this paper, we conducted one session with senior managers from NASA Headquarters
and from the two largest Implementing Centers. Six periods of data were generated, of which three were under the Cost Cap
process and three were under the MCCS process. The relative measures of MCCS vs. Cost Cap were: HQPayo® averaged 753
under Cost Cap and 900 under MCCS. ICpayo® averaged 1086 under Cost Cap and 1400 under MCCS.
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